



Storing Personal Data on Mobile Devices

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A few words about us ...

- University of Piraeus, Greece
- School of Information and Communication Technologies
- [Department of Digital Systems](#)
- [System Security Laboratory](#) founded in 2008
- Research Development & Education
 - systems security, network security
 - computer security, forensics
 - risk analysis & management
- MSc course on "[Digital Systems Security](#)" since 2009



University of
Piraeus




Outline of the presentation

- Introduction
 - Operating Systems
 - Mobile Operating Systems
 - Mobile Devices
- Personal Data stored/maintained in Mobile Devices
 - What ?
 - Where ?
- How Information Leakage Occurs


Introduction

- An **operating system (OS)** is **software** that manages **hardware** and **software** resources.
- It provides a **platform** on top of which all other **programs** and **software** can run.



Introduction

- An OS provides **vital services** such as:
 - Interfacing Computer Hardware to Applications
 - Scheduling & Multitasking
 - Memory Management
 - File System Interface
 - Networking
 - User Interface
 - Protection and Security Mechanisms



Introduction

- There are different **Operating Systems** for different **purposes** and **needs**.
- **Mobile Devices** also use **Operating Systems** to provide their functionalities



Mobile Operating Systems

- **Mobile OSs** face challenges because of:
 - Limited **computing** and **networking** capabilities
 - Limited **battery power**
 - Constraints and restrictions on the **physical size**
- **Smart Mobile Devices**
 - **Inherit** the vulnerabilities of Personal Computers
 - Arise **new security issues** because of **their nature**
(portable, always on, can be easily lost, etc.)

Mobile Operating Systems

- **Smart Mobile Devices that use major mobile OSs:**

- Smartphones
- Tablets
- Notebooks
- Televisions
- Photocameras
- Game machines



Personal Data in Mobile Devices

- Smartphones & tablets store **private and sensitive personal information** such as:
 - Contacts (*phone numbers, email addr., voip addr. etc.*)
 - Emails (*messages & attachments*)
 - SMS, Calendar, Cellular Identity (IMSI, IMEI)
 - Multimedia (*videos & photos*)
- **GPS receivers, constant internet connectivity & vulnerabilities of the cellular technology** can be used to digitally and physically **track users!**



Personal Data in Mobile Devices

- Where do **Smart Devices** store information?
 - **Internal Flash Memory (NAND) :**
 - Memory chips **soldered** onto the mainboard.
 - Do **not** require continual **power supply** to maintain data.
 - They are separated in **partitions** in order for the operating system to be installed.
 - Operating System's kernel, libraries, services and applications **are being executed** from internal flash memory.




Personal Data in Mobile Devices

- Where do **Smart Devices** store information?
 - **External Flash Memory: (SD cards)**
 - External memory chip that can be used to store **large volumes of data** such as:
 - Multimedia (*Text, Audio, Video*).
 - Can be used to store and **run applications**.
 - External flash memories are usually formatted using FAT32 filesystem.



Personal Data in Mobile Devices

- Where do **Smart Devices** store information?
 - **Random Access Memory (RAM):** (*volatile memory*)
 - Stores data **temporarily** that is necessary for the **OS services** and **applications**
 - Application data,
 - Programming Variables,
 - Credentials (*usernames, passwords*),
 - Cookies, Network Data...



How Information Leakage Occurs

■ Application Rights

- Applications often require **access rights** that are not necessary!
 - For example, a **camera application** does not need access to the **phone's contacts!**
- Users **grant access** to the applications to **use** them
- **3rd party app stores** and **cracked apps** pose **serious security threats** in the era of Mobile Smart Devices



Appthority: Summer 2014, App Reputation Report

- It provides **Mobile App Risk Management Services** that employs **static, dynamic and behavioral** analysis
- 99% of **TOP FREE Apps** had at least one risky behaviour both for **Android and iOS**
- 87% and 78% of **TOP PAID Apps** for **Android and iOS** respectively had at least one risky behaviour



Figure 1a. Top **FREE** Apps with Risky Behaviors: 100 iOS and 100 Android






Figure 1b. Top **PAID** Apps with Risky Behaviors: iOS and Android



Appthority: Summer 2014, App Reputation Report

• FREE



Figure 2a. What Data is Most Often Collected



Appthority: Summer 2014, App Reputation Report

• FREE

Figure 2b. Where the Data Goes



Applications & Malware

- **DroidDream** is a mobile **botnet** appeared in **2011**.
 - It uses a **Trojan** contained in **50 Official Android Apps** that:
 1. **Root** your device,
 2. **Leak** sensitive information,
 3. **Open backdoor**, so hackers can control the infected phones.
- **MDK** is a botnet in china (2012) that spread using the famous games **Temple Run** and **Fishing Joy!**
 - It allows the remote control of the infected devices!

IMSI Catcher



Internal/External Storage

- **Application information & data files** can be **extracted/recovered** from Smart Devices:
 - **Internal Storage** using **root file managers**
 - You can explore **all of the device's files** and **take control of your rooted device**
 - **External Storage**
 - By removing the SD card from the mobile device and put it to a PC.

Internal/External Storage

- **Recent Research** performed by our team showed that **sensitive information can be recovered** such as:
 - Messages & Emails
 - Contacts
 - Cryptographic Keys
 - Credentials (*usernames & passwords*)
 - Multimedia Files
 - Identification values (IMEI, MAC addresses, etc)

Internal/External Storage

- The **steps** that should be followed are:
 1. **Acquisition** of an **image** of the **internal** or **external** storage
 - Can be performed using **open source software** (*e.g., dd (linux/unix)*)
 2. **File Carving**
 - Finds the **files** that exist in the **raw data image**.
 - Both **deleted** and **undeleted** files can be recovered.
 - **Recovery** of the **deleted** files depends on the device **usage**.
 - Opensource programs for File recovery are: **foremost, photorec, The Sleuth Kit**, etc.

Recovery Process



`dd if=/dev/sdb of=./image.raw`

`foremost -t jpg,pdf,mp3 -l image.raw`



JPG



PDF

Adobe



MP3

```
000001010101000000000001010000101000000100100010001000101010101010101
0101010010010000000000000000000000000000000000001100000000000000011010000
0000000000000011010000000000000000010101000000000000001111100000000000
00000000000000001100011100011000110001000000000001100100001101000110001
1000110101111011110111101111100000000000000000000010000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000001111100000000000111110000000
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011010111101111011110111100000000000000000000000100000110000000010000
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Files Recovered!!!



Random Access Memory


- Recently, **Mobile Forensics** focus on **RAM**
- RAM maintains **temporary data** required by the **services** and **system**.
- Information **exists** in RAM **may not exist** anywhere else.
- Currently, the only **open source** tool to acquire **RAM dumps** is **LiME**.
- It is a **kernel module** compatible with **Linux** & **Android** systems



Linux Memory Extractor

- Requirements for **LiME** :
 - **Rooted** device to insert the **LiME module** in the kernel.
 - The **Kernel Source Code** of the device
 - The **LiME Source Code**.
 - **Compile** the device source code kernel on a PC.
 - Then, **compile the LiME module** that relies on:
 - The **Hardware** of the mobile device.
 - On the **Kernel** of the mobile device
 - **Android** version

RAM acquisition procedure



Ram analysis procedure

RAM dumps can be analyzed using **open source programs** such as:

- **Volatilitux:** Linux version of Volatility. Supports 32 & 64 bit images of **Linux OSs**
- File Carving tools such as **foremost**
- Forensics suites such as **The Sleuth Kit & Autopsy**
- **Hex Editors**

Personal Data in RAM!!!

- Our Team has conducted **RAM analysis** for several applications including:
 - **Browsers, VPN applications** and other **security critical** applications.
- Significant **artifacts** recovered from RAM were:
 - Credentials
 - Files uploaded/downloaded from internet
 - Cookies
 - Exchanged Messages, SMS, etc...

Personal Data in RAM!!!

Dimitris Apostolopoulos, Giannis Marinakis, Christoforos Ntantogian, Christos Xenakis, "Discovering authentication credentials in volatile memory of Android mobile devices", *In Proc. 12th IFIP Conference on e-Business, e-Services, e-Society (I3E 2013)*, Athens, Greece, April 2013.

Christoforos Ntantogian, Dimitris Apostolopoulos, Giannis Marinakis, Christos Xenakis, "Evaluating the privacy of Android mobile applications under forensic analysis," *Computers & Security, Elsevier Science, Vol. 42, pp:66-76, May 2014*

← PREVIOUS NEXT →
EXPORT CONTENTS ADD NOTE


ASCII ([display](#) - [report](#)) * Hex ([display](#) - [report](#)) * ASCII Strings ([display](#) - [report](#))
File Type: data

Unit: 176538

128	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
144	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
160	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
176	01000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
192	0000803f	ffffffff	00000000	01000000	...?
208	00000000	ffffffff	808080ff	00000000
224	16030801	17030801	18030801	00000000
240	00000000	00000000	00000000	23010000 #...
256	50180140	00000000	83000000	00000000	P..@
272	7b002200	63006f00	6d006d00	61006e00	{". c.o. m.m. a.n.
288	64002200	3a002200	61007500	74006800	d.". :.". a.u. t.h.
304	65006e00	74006900	63006100	74006500	e.n. t.i. c.a. t.e.
320	64005f00	70006900	6e006700	5f007500	d._. p.i. n.g. _u.
336	73006500	72002200	2c002200	70006100	s.e. r.". ". p.a.
352	73007300	77006f00	72006400	22003a00	s.s. w.o. r.d. ". :.
368	22006400	73007300	65006300	22002c00	"d. s.s. e.c. ",,
384	22006100	70006900	5f007600	65007200	".a. p.i. _v. e.r.
400	73006900	6f006e00	22003a00	22003800	s.i. o.n. ". :. ".8.
416	22002c00	22007500	73006500	72006e00	"., ".u. s.e. r.n.
432	61006d00	65002200	3a002200	64007200	a.m. e.". :.". d.r.
448	40006600	6f006f00	2e006300	6f006d00	@.f. o.o. _c. o.m.
464	22007d00	00000000	00000000	00000000	".}.
480	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
496	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000

SSL security issue

- **Secure Socket Layer (SSL)** is a standard security technology for establishing an **encrypted link** between a **server** and a **client**.




SSL security issue

- Although SSL transmits the **user data** over an **encrypted channel**
 - Data can be **recovered unencrypted** from **RAM!**
- In mobile devices, the applications **do not delete the contents of RAM** that are no longer used
 - Even if we kill the service.
- Upon closing an application, the **used RAM is marked as free** without deleting its contents.
 - **Possible data leakage!!!**

Session Hijacking

- **Session Hijacking** is the exploitation of a **valid computer session** to gain **unauthorized access** to information or services.
- HTTP **cookies** are used in order to **gain access** to **web services**.
- On a **user login** a **cookie** is created and stored in user's browser.
- If the user **does not log out**, the cookie is **valid**.
- If the **cookie is stolen**, anyone can access the service **without** the need of the **credentials**


Session Hijacking



Session Hijacking

- **Cookies can be stolen** using:
 - **Browser Files:** Anyone can copy and access these files (*without administrator access*)
 - **RAM Dumps**
 - **Cross Site Scripting Attacks**
- Service providers **associate cookies** with **users**:
 - IP address, OS and Browser
- Although the above parameters **may change**, we discovered that many sites **accept valid cookies!**

Session Hijacking



Conclusions

- **Mobile Devices** store/maintain a **lot of personal – sensitive information** such as *contacts, emails, text messages, credentials, cookies, application information, location, identities, mac addresses, etc.*
- **Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)** is a new trend where users use their own devices in **corporate environments**.
- **Mobile devices** are constantly carried by users, are always on, rarely are rebooted are accessible through the air interface & can be **stolen** easily.

Conclusions

- **Data leakage** is feasible and, thus, **security measures** have to be taken into account.
- Users **must logout** after using a **web service** to avoid **Session Hijacking**
- **Rebooting** a mobile **deletes sensitive data** that might **exist in RAM** after using a **critical service**.
- Every user should be **security aware**.

Thank you for Attention

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